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Abstract. Software agents’ ability to interact within different open sys-
tems, designed by different groups, presupposes an agreement on an un-
ambiguous definition of a set of concepts, used to describe the context
of the interaction and the communication language the agents can use.
Agents’ interactions ought to allow for reliable expectations on the possi-
ble evolution of the system; however, in open systems interacting agents
may not conform to predefined specifications. A possible solution is to
define interaction environments including a normative component, with
suitable rules to regulate the behaviour of agents.
To tackle this problem, we propose an application-independent model of
artificial institutions that can be used to define open multiagent systems.
With respect to other approaches to artificial (or electronic) institutions,
which mainly focus on the definition of the normative component of open
systems, our proposal has a wider scope, in that we model the social con-
text of the interaction, define the semantics of an Agent Communication
Language to operate on such a context, and give an operational defini-
tion of the norms that are necessary to constrain the agents’ actions. In
particular, we define the semantics of a library of communicative acts in
terms of operations on agents’ social reality, more specifically on com-
mitments, and regard norms as event-driven rules that, when fired by
events happening in the system, create or modify a set of commitments.
An interesting aspect of our proposal is that both the definition of the
ACL and the definition of norms are based on the same notion of com-
mitment. Therefore an agent capable of reasoning on commitments can
reason both on the semantics of communicative acts and on the norma-
tive system.
1 Introduction
Since the advent of the Internet, about ten years ago, the landscape of computer
science has substantially changed. For the first time, it has become feasible to
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2develop open distributed systems, that is, software systems whose components
can aggregate dynamically and are free to enter and leave an interaction at their
will. In an open distributed system, the interacting agents are typically designed
and implemented by different parties, and may represent conflicting interests, as
it happens for example in e-commerce applications. This fact has two important
consequences. The first is that interaction will not even be possible unless agents
are designed to comply with well-defined standards. The second consequence is
that interaction will not lead to coherent outcomes unless the agents’ behaviour
is suitably regulated. The first problem (i.e., the problem of standards) has
been tackled by a number of organizations, including FIPA, the Foundation
for Intelligent Physical Agents (http://www.fipa.org). The second problem (i.e.,
the problem of regulating interactions) is much more elusive, and has become
an important object of research at least since Noriega’s and Sierra’s works on
electronic institutions in the late nineteen-nineties [21, 20]. Since then, several
authors (see for example [10, 1, 30, 31, 11, 3]) have contributed to the specification
of electronic institutions and artificial institutions [14, 34].
An electronic institution is usually viewed as a set of norms, which the agents
interacting within an open distributed systems ought to follow [20]. Interaction
protocols themselves can be conceived as sets of norms (about what an agent
may do and when), and are the most obvious component of an electronic insti-
tution [11]. As a whole, the function of an electronic institution is to guarantee
that if its norms are followed by all agents, the interaction will produce a de-
sirable outcome. Indeed, it is part of the very concept of an autonomous agent
that norms may be violated; the system implementing an electronic institution
ought to detect such violations and to manage the situation, for example by
applying suitable sanctions. Given that norms are an essential component of
social reality (see for example [25]), we can regard electronic institution as a
means for imposing a well-defined structure to the social reality within which
agents interact. However, norms are just one component of social reality; other
components, which also seem to us to be important for the specification of open
distributed systems, have been largely neglected by most proposals concerning
electronic institutions. For this reason we would like to put forward an extension
of the concept of an electronic institution, that we call “artificial institution”.
Social reality is that part of the world that exists only because it is collec-
tively recognized to exist by a group of agents. Norms are an obvious example of
something that exists only because it is accepted by the members of some com-
munity; other important components are: (i) a socially defined ontology, and (ii),
linguistic conventions. Let us briefly analyse these components.
Institutions not only regulate, but also create components of social reality.
For example, the institution of ownership does not just regulate a pre-existing
piece of reality, but creates the very concept of owning something. In other
words, an institution introduces a new ontology, including a set of entities with
their properties and relationships. A very important class of entities created
by an institution is the set of institutional actions. For example, actions like
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stealing) are only meaningful within a suitable institution of ownership.
Contrary to natural actions, like eating or walking around, institutional ac-
tions cannot be executed only by exploiting physical abilities. Rather, they re-
quire suitable conventions that allow agents to perform institutional actions by
producing certain forms of behaviour, typically linguistic behaviour. The need
of specifying linguistic conventions for open distributed systems has been recog-
nised at least since the definition of KQLM [12]. Since then, Agent Commu-
nication Languages (ACLs) have been an important subject of research. Early
models of multiagent systems tended to regard ACLs as local to every specific
system (or even to every pair of roles in the system, as suggested by the Aalaadin
model [17]). Later research in agent communication, however, highlighted the im-
portance of defining a universal ACL [7, 29]. Moreover, some approaches to the
semantics of ACLs show that the very definition of a communication language
may be based on elements of social reality, like the concept of commitment [28, 4,
5, 14]: if this approach is correct, ACL messages can be understood only within
a suitable system of artificial institutions.
In general, producing an instance of the correct conventional behaviour is
necessary but not sufficient to perform an institutional action. For example, the
president of society can open the annual meeting by saying “The meeting is
open”, while a generic member of the society cannot do the same. The issue,
here, is power or, as we prefer to call it, authorization: institutional actions are
successful only if they are performed by an authorized agent, and authorizations
are typically associated to the roles played by the agent in the institution. Even
authorized actions, however, cannot always be performed freely. For example,
the owner of a car is authorized to sell it, but may be prohibited to do so by his
or her spouse (in this example two institutions, ownership and family, interact).
In an institution, a set of norms typically regulate the execution of authorized
action.
This brief analysis shows that institutions are made up by a number of com-
ponents: an ontology (including the definition of institutional actions), a set of
authorizations to perform institutional actions (typically associated to roles),
a set of linguistic conventions for the execution of institutional actions, and a
system of norms regulating the agents’ interaction. All these components are so
strictly interconnected that they have to be dealt with within a single concep-
tual framework. The metamodel of artificial institutions that we propose in this
paper is an attempt to define such a framework. Our presentation is structured
as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our metamodel of artificial institutions,
defining their fundamental concepts and relationships. In Section 3 an example
of the specification of an artificial institution, the Basic Institution, is presented.
Using the notion of commitment defined by the Basic Institution, in Section 4
we present our operational definition of norms. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude
with a brief discussion of related work and open questions.
42 A Metamodel of Artificial Institutions
Artificial institutions are models of institutional reality which specify a class of
interaction domains by exploiting a set of common concepts and notations. For
this reason we introduce a metamodel of artificial institutions to describe an
abstract syntax and a semantics for each construct that characterizes artificial
institutions. In Figure 1 the abstract syntax is presented by means of a notation
inspired by the UML metamodel [23], showing the fundamental concepts and
the relationships existing between them.
Even if we have adopted a notation inspired by UML, we are not prescribing
that artificial institutions and agents acting within them should be implemented
by object oriented technologies. In fact, artificial institutions are intended to
specify institutional reality for open multiagent systems, which are characterized
by the fact that heterogeneous agents realized with different technologies and
by different organizations should interact. Therefore, it is important that the
specification does not commit to a specific implementation language, platform,
or internal architecture. For this reason, we do not exploit most of the features
of object oriented technologies, like methods or polymorphism, and to avoid
confusion we will not talk of classes. Therefore, we do not adopt the meta-
metamodel of UML4, which introduces, among others, the concept of MetaClass
and MetaOperations.
We use UML as a starting point, reusing its well known graphical notation
and the Object Constraint Language (OCL [22]) as our language to express
constraints. An advantage of this approach is that it employs concepts that are
close to the intuition and knowledge of practitioners. We believe the metamodel
we have developed can be easily understood by software engineers who design
and implement open multiagent systems.
Like the metamodel of UML, our metamodel of artificial institution has a
declarative semantics and suppresses implementation details. Therefore, we ab-
stract away from methods and implementation issues and provide an abstract
syntax to specify agent interaction systems.
In this paper we do not propose a specific architecture for the management of
institutional states in real systems, because we think that different architectures
may be chosen and adapted according to the needs of real systems. Anyway,
agents using the interfaces specified through an artificial institution model should
not even notice the existence of such design and implementation choices.
In the following sections we shall introduce a notation for the components of
artificial institutions and describe their meaning in natural language, whereas
the metamodel reported in Figure 1 provides a set of well-formedness rules for
a model of an artificial institution. In Section 3 we will exemplify our approach
by defining a model of a specific institution, the Basic Institution.
2.1 The Core Ontology
4 For reason of conciseness we do not discuss our meta-metamodel and the relations
existing between it and the meta-metamodel defined by UML.
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Fig. 1. The artificial institution metamodel.
Entities In our view, artificial institutions are a technological extension of hu-
man reality and therefore they should represent part of the state of the real world.
We assume the existence of external ontologies defining classes of entities, their
relationships and the relevant attributes representing physical properties. For
example, an entity may represent a book, which may have a number of pages
and a weight. We represent entities, attributes and relations with UML class
diagrams.
The core ontology is introduced to define new features relative to such entities
which exist only thanks to agents’ common agreement. For instance, the price
of a product on sale exists only because a community of agents recognizes such
a property.
For this reason we distinguish between two types of attributes that can be
associated to the definition of entities: natural attributes, which represent physi-
cal properties and are defined by external ontologies, and institutional attributes,
which reflect the existence of a common agreement and are introduced by core
ontologies.
Sometimes, core ontologies define entities whose attributes are only institu-
tional, like the commitment entity defined by the Basic Institution described in
Section 3. We refer to such entities as institutional entities.
Institutional Actions In our framework we assume that agents can mod-
ify only institutional attributes by performing a particular set of actions, that
is, institutional actions [6]. An institutional action describes how institutional
attributes change as a consequence of its performance. For example, in [14]
6communicative acts are regarded as institutional actions, because they create
commitments or modify their attributes.
More precisely, an institutional action is characterized by:
– an action name;
– a possibly empty set of parameters;
– a possibly empty set of ontological preconditions, which specify the values
that certain institutional attributes must have for the action to be meaningful
(for example, opening an auction is meaningful only if the auction is not
already open);
– a nonempty set of postconditions, which specify the values of certain insti-
tutional attributes after a successful performance of the action.
Preconditions and postconditions of institutional actions are expressed through
OCLExpressions [22], which can refer only to the parameters of the institutional
action or institutional attributes defined by the core ontology, reflecting the fact
that the only effect of an institutional action is to modify institutional attributes.
Because institutional actions change institutional attributes, which exist only
thanks to common agreement, it follows that institutional actions have an intrin-
sic social nature. Therefore, agents cannot perform such actions by exploiting
causal links occurring in the natural world, as it would be done to open a door or
to move a physical object. Furthermore, a crucial condition for the actual perfor-
mance of institutional actions is that they must be public, that is, made known
to the relevant agents by means of some action that can be directly executed
by an artificial agent. In the human world such instrumental actions vary from
certain bodily movements (raising one’s arm to vote), to the use of specific phys-
ical tools (waving a white flag to surrender), to the use of language (saying “the
auction is open” to open an auction). We assume that in a multiagent system
all institutional actions are performed by means of a single type of instrumental
action, namely exchanging a message.
Roles A core ontology also defines a set of relationships between agents and
entities, and we regard such relationships as roles; thus roles are always defined
relative to entities. For example, an agent can be the owner of a commodity.
Clearly, such relationships are supported by the common agreement of agents
and therefore roles have the same nature and characteristics of institutional
attributes. Therefore, roles are also institutional facts and they can be changed
only by performing institutional actions.
As the metamodel reported in Figure 1 shows, a role is related to authoriza-
tions and Event-Condition-Action rules (ECA rules, see Section 2.3) which are
also used to represent norms (see Section 4). Therefore, roles can also be seen
as way to relate agents to their authorizations and norms, abstracting from the
concrete agents that will be actually involved in an interaction. In general, a
sound specification of an artificial institution cannot define a role with an empty
set of authorizations or ECA rules.
7Events A core ontology also describes a set of events which are relevant for the
definition and activation of ECA rules (see Section 2.3). UML models four kinds
of events [23] : signals, calls, passing of time and change in state. Unfortunately,
the notation proposed in UML for modeling events is bound to features of State
Machine and Statechart Diagrams, while we need a way to describe events in
general.
In our framework, an event type can have attributes, providing information
about the state transition that caused it, and it is possible to model hierarchies of
event types. Moreover we assume that every event has a time attribute reporting
the time at which an event has occurred. In our formalization we have singled
out three main categories of events:
– a TimeEvent, which occurs when the system reaches a certain instant of
time;
– a ChangeEvent, which happens when an institutional entity changes in some
way. This kind of event type can be further specialized:
• an AttributeChange, which is registered when an attribute has changed
its value.
• a RelationChange, which happens when a new relation is created or an
existing one between two institutional entities is dropped.
• a GeneralizationChange, which occurs when an entity modifies its type
in a given taxonomy.
– an ActionEvent, that happens when an agent perform an action. In partic-
ular, an interesting type of this kind of events is ExchMsg, which represents
the act of exchanging a message.
The definition of event types allows us to define event templates, that is,
event types that have some restriction on certain attributes and describe a set of
possible event occurrences. Event templates are used in the on section of ECA
rules to specify what kind of domain dependent events activates a rule.
2.2 Authorizations and Conventions
Given that institutional actions modify institutional attributes, agents cannot
directly perform such actions. Instead, we assume that all institutional actions
are performed by exchanging messages, thanks to constitutive rules [25] which
bind the exchange of a message to the performance of an institutional action.
To model the connection between instrumental actions and institutional ac-
tions we introduce the notion of a convention, that is, an agreement about what
type of message is bound to a given type of institutional action. In our model
the definition of a convention has the following generic form:
ExchMsg(message type, sender, receivers,iaction(parameters)) =conv
iaction(parameters)
In [14] we have defined some useful conventions for the performance of insti-
tutional actions (in particular communicative acts). For example, by definition
8[24], the content of a declaration describes precisely the institutional changes
that it brings about. Therefore, we take messages of type declare as the funda-
mental means to perform institutional actions and the convention is defined as
follows:
ExchMsg(declare, sender, receivers, content) =conv
iaction(parameters)
By itself, a convention is not sufficient to guarantee the successful perfor-
mance of an institutional action by the exchange of the appropriate message:
indeed, some additional contextual conditions2 must be satisfied about the agent
that sends the message, about the agents that receive the message, and about
the state of the system in relation to the content of the message.
Conditions on the sender of the message. The sender of the message must
be authorized to perform an institutional action. In the specification of an in-
teraction system authorizations are expressed in term of roles; for example, only
the auctioneer can open an auction by sending a suitable message to the partic-
ipants. Moreover an authorization can be given only if certain conditions about
the state of the system, expressed by suitable Boolean expressions, are satisfied.
For example, it may be established that an auction is validly opened only if there
are at least two participants. Therefore, we abstractly define the authorization
to perform a specific institutional action (with given parameters) associating it
to a role defined in the context of a specific entity as follows:
Auth(entity.role, iaction(param), conditions)
It is worth highlighting that authorizations are a necessary condition for the
successful performance of an institutional action and that designers should spec-
ify a set of authorizations whenever they introduce a new institutional action.
As we will see in Section 4, this fact allows us to assume that every authorized
institutional actions that is not prohibited is permitted.
Conditions about the receivers of the message. Secondly, messages realizing
institutional actions should be received by all agents that are affected by the
performance of the act; for example all the participants of an auction must re-
ceive the message that opens it.
Conditions about the state of the system. All the preconditions of the institu-
tional action associated to the performance of the exchange of the message must
be satisfied; for instance, an auction cannot be closed if it has not been opened
yet.
2 Following Searle [25], the construction of social reality in the human world is pos-
sible thanks to constitutive rules of the form X counts as Y in C. Similarly, in an
artificial system constitutive rules bind the performance of a message exchange to
the corresponding institutional action only if certain conditions about the context
are satisfied.
92.3 Event-Condition-Action Rules
The last component of our metamodel is represented by Event-Condition-Action
rules, which allow us to model the fact that institutional reality may change as
a consequence of the occurrence of certain events. For example, a competition
may start at a fixed time instant and be considered closed at another time
without an agent having declared it. ECA rules are also useful to model how the
performance an institutional action executed within an institution may affect
another institution (see for example [34]).
Inspired by Active Database models, we define an ECA rule as composed by
three elements:
1. an event template, which represents the class of events which may activate
the rule.
2. a condition, expressed through a Boolean OCLExpression, which can refer
to the variable e which contains a description of the event that has activated
the rule.
3. a nonempty set of institutional actions which are executed by the rules.
The semantics of ECA rules is given as usual: when an event matching the
description given by the event template occurs in the system, the variable e is
filled with the event instance and the condition is evaluated; if the condition
is verified, the set of institutional actions are executed and their effects are
brought about in the system. We assume that the system is authorized by default
to perform every institutional action. In our model, ECA rules are specified
according to the following notation:
on e: event-template
if condition then
do institutionalAction(parameters)+
As we will see in Section 4, we define norms as ECA rules that perform
institutional actions creating, canceling or modifying commitments. Therefore,
before introducing norms, we need to define the Basic Institutions, that is, the
artificial institution that defines what social commitments are.
3 The Basic Institution
The Basic Institution is the institution that defines a fundamental concept:
the notion of social commitment. The importance of commitment is due to the
fact that, from our perspective, it is essential to express the meaning of most
types of communicative acts (see [13, 14]) and because it is used to define the
semantics of norms as will be shown in Section 4. Therefore we assume that the
Basic Institution has to be used, together with other special institutions, in the
specification of every open interaction framework.
In this section we report a fragment of the specification of an artificial insti-
tution, the Basic Institution, using the concepts and the meta-model introduced
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so far (for the complete specification see [14]). Other institutions, that we call
special institutions, can then be defined to model the aspects of institutional
reality typical of certain application domains. For instance, for electronic com-
merce applications it will be necessary to model the institutions of ownership,
money, business transactions, auctions, and so on. A detailed specification of
the English auction, of the Dutch Auction, and of the Auction House as special
institutions can be found in [14, 34].
The Basic Institution defines the ontology of commitment, the institutional
actions necessary to operate on it, and a set of authorizations for the performance
of these institutional actions. In general, institutions also define sets of norms to
regulate the behaviour of agents, but in our current view, the Basic Institution
does not specify norms.
3.1 Commitments and Temporal Propositions
In this paper we give only a short description of our model of commitment and
of temporal proposition, that are used to represent the content of commitments
(a complete treatment of these two concepts can be found in [14, 5]). A commit-
ment is characterized by the following attributes: a debtor, a creditor, a content,
and a state. Figure 2 represents the class diagram of the ontology of the Ba-
sic Institution. In the rest of the paper we will refer to commitments using the
following notation:
Comm(state, debtor, creditor, content)
state
Commitment
Agent
debtor
creditor
statement
timeInterval
mode
truth-value
TemporalProposition
content*
*
1
1..*
1
1
Fig. 2. Class diagram of the ontology of the Basic Institution
The content of commitments is expressed using temporal propositions. A
temporal proposition is characterized by a statement about a state of affairs or
about an action. The statement is referred to a time interval with two possible
differentmodes: exist (∃) or for all (∀). The truth-value of a temporal proposition
is initially undefined (⊥). It becomes true, thanks to a “notifier”, if the mode is
for all and the statement is true for every instant of the associated time interval
or if the mode is exist and the statement is true for some instant in the associated
time interval, otherwise it becomes false. Temporal propositions are represented
with the following notation:
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TP (statement, [tstart, tend],mode, truth-value)
A commitment undergoes the life cycle described in [13] by reacting either to
institutional actions performed by agents or to domain-dependent events, which
modify the truth value of the temporal proposition in its content. If its temporal
proposition becomes true, the commitment becomes fulfilled ; if it becomes false
the commitment becomes violated. For instance the commitment of agent a1 to
agent a2 to open the auction i within 10 minutes from now (or between now
and now + 10) is represented as:
Comm(pending, a1, a2, TP (open(a1, auctioni), [now, now+10m], ∃,⊥))
In our framework every agent is authorized to create a commitment by
performing the makeCommitment institutional action, whose successful perfor-
mance creates an unset commitment. The debtor of an unset commitment may
refuse it by executing setCancel, or it may undertake the proposed commitment
by executing setPending. We represent a refused commitment by means of the
cancelled state, whereas an accepted commitment is depicted with the pend-
ing state. The creditor of a pending or unset commitment can always set it
to cancelled. Here, due to space limitation, we report only the definition of one
institutional action and of one authorization. The institutional actionmakePend-
ingComm, used in Section 4, creates a pending commitment and its execution
coincides with the sequential performance of makeCommitment and setPending :
name : makePendingComm(debtor, creditor, content)
pre : not Comm.allInstances()→ exists(c|c.debtor = debtor
and c.creditor = creditor and c.content = content)
post : Comm.allInstances()→ exists(c|c.state=pending and
c.debtor=debtor and c.creditor=creditor and
c.content = content)
Every registered agent RegAgt is authorized to create a commitment having
itself as debtor:
Auth(RegAgt,makePendingComm(debtor, creditor, content),
RegAgt = debtor).
4 Norms
In the literature, it is possible to find two different approaches to the specifica-
tion of norms for open systems. The more formal approach uses deontic logic to
express the semantics of norms and is more suitable when the goal is to verify the
consistency of a set of norms [8]. The other approach focuses on the operational
aspects of norms, and is more suitable when the goal is the actual implementa-
tion of norms in open systems [32, 16]. In this paper we study the formalization
of norms from the institutional and operational perspective(opposite to the agent
12
perspective) [32], that is, our goal is to define norms that make the evolution
of the state of an interaction system partially predictable without violating the
autonomy of the interacting agents. In order to reach this purpose, norms de-
scribe, on the basis of the state of the system, the expected behaviour of the
agents playing different roles, and make it possible to detect deviations from
such a behaviour, that is, the violation of obligations and prohibitions defined
in the system.
As already said in Section 2.3 in our model norms are a special type of ECA
rules characterized by the fact that when they are fired by events happening in
the system, they create or cancel commitments to perform or to not perform an
action within a certain interval of time, thus affecting each agent that satisfies a
suitable selection expression. Usually the collection of liable agents corresponds
to the set of agents that play a given role in the institution.
From our point of view, commitments are not a specialization of norms as in
[19] and norms are not themselves a special kind of commitments as in [2] and
[27]. We perceive norms as rules that manipulate commitments of the agents en-
gaged in an interaction. This because in the abstract formalization of a system it
is important to model norms associated to roles rather than to individual agents,
whereas during the actual evolution of the system it is fundamental to create
commitments associated to individual agents and to detect their fulfillment or
violation. Obviously such violations can be interpreted also as the violation of
the corresponding norm.
When an agent fills a role in an institution, we assume that it accepts that
norms will create commitments binding it to a pseudoagent representing the
institution, which we call institutional agent. Such an agent allows us to keep
trace of the commitments created by an instance of an institution. This also
means that commitments created by norms of an institution can be cancelled
only by other norms defined by the same institution, because only the creditor
of a pending commitment is authorized to set it to cancelled [14]. The general
structure of a norm can be described as follows:
on e : event-template
if condition then
foreach agent in selection-expression
do commitment-Ops
where agent is an identifier varying on the set of agents that satisfie the
selection expression; selection-expression is a list of agent identifiers or a role
defined in a certain artificial institution; commitment-operations is a sequence
of commitment operations defined using BNF notation as follows:
commitment-Ops := comm-Op | comm-Op, commitment-Ops
comm-Op := makePendComm(agent, instAgent, content)|
cancelComm(agent, instAgent, content)
content := TP (action, [t, t], ∃) | TP (¬action, [t, t],∃)
t := now | event.time | instant | now+number | event.time+number
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where action is an institutional action as described in Section 2; now is the time
of the system when the temporal proposition is created and instant is an instant
of time.
In [14] we give a formalization of the English Auction Institution. Here we
report only an example of a norm that creates an obligation for the auctioneer
to open the auction when the start time has elapsed, if at least two agents have
been registered as participants:
on e: TimeEvent(a.startT ime)
if UnsetEnglishAuction.participant.sizeOf() >= 2 then
foreach agent in UnsetEnglishAuction.auctioneer
do makePendingComm(agent, institutionalAgent,
TP (openAuction(UnsetEnglishAuction.id), [now, now + δ], ∃))
where δ is the time allowed to the agent to fulfill its obligation.
4.1 Normative Positions
Using our metamodel of artificial institutions and the definition of norms it is
possible to represent fundamental normative positions between agents [26]:
– First of all, an institutional action has to be authorized, that is, it has to
be accepted by the agents taking part to the interaction (or their designers)
that the exchange of a message counts as the performance of an institutional
action. If an agent performs an instrumental action bound by a convention
to an intitutional action ai, but is not authorized to perform ai, neither the
“counts as” relation will hold, nor the effects of ai will take place.
– When an action is authorized and is not prohibited, it is permitted. Usually
in the agent literature authorization is not distinguished from permission or
the former encompasses the latter. Coherently with the concept of institu-
tionalized power [18], we distinguish between the notions of authorization
and permission. The main difference between authorization and permission
resides in the effects of the action. Whereas the former represents a neces-
sary condition for the execution of institutional action, permission reflects
the need to regulate the performance of authorized actions, but cannot pre-
vent the effects deriving from the performance of a forbidden act.
– An action is prohibited when a norm has created a commitment not to per-
form it. If an agent is prohibited to perform action ai but performs it anyway,
the effects of the action take place and the commitment to not perform the
action is violated. At this point it is up to the system to impose sanctions
to the misbehaving agent, and possibly recover the system to a safe state.
– Obligations are represented by commitments, created by norms, to perform
an action of a given type. It may happen that agents do not perform obliga-
tory actions; in such a case the commitment becomes violated and the system
does not evolve to the expected new state. The violation of an obligation may
therefore be punished, and in critical cases the system may be recovered to
a safe state by performing a suitable set of actions.
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The treatment of sanctions, either direct (fine, expulsion) or indirect (trust,
reputation), and the study of plans to recover the system from unsafe states are
a wide and interesting research problem we plan to tackle in the future.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper we have described in short our operational model of Artificial
Institutions that can be used for the specification of open interaction systems.
In particular, we have focused on the definition of a standard syntax and an
intuitive semantics of the concepts that an agent, or its designer, has to take
into account and to reason on, in order to be able to interact properly with
different systems.
Existing proposals for the definition of electronic institutions like the one
proposed in the EIDE platform [10, 9], the one presented by Cliffe and Padget
[3], or the OMNI framework [33] are mainly focused on the specification of the
normative component. Unlike them, our model includes also the concepts for
defining the institutional reality of the system. Moreover, differently from [10,
9], where the semantics of the communicative acts is given in terms of predefined
state transitions, in our model it is possible, using commitments, to define an
application independent semantics of a Communicative Act Library, as presented
in [14], with a syntax compatible with FIPA-ACL [15].
As far as the formalization of normative aspects is concerned, likewise the
other mentioned proposals, we distinguish among permission, obligation, and
prohibition. We also distinguish between normative aspects and facts dealing
with institutional power [18], which separate meaningful/empowered actions
from meaningless actions that do not have an effect. In our opinion, this last
type of fact, like in [1], should be considered as part of the declarative apparatus
of an Electronic Institution, and not of the normative one. Indeed we think that
norms regulate agent interaction by indicating, among all meaningful actions
at a certain stage, those that are obliged or forbidden. Moreover an interesting
aspect of our proposal is its uniformity; in fact, our operational formalization of
norms uses the same concepts used for the definition of the semantics of ACL,
that is, social commitments.
Several research questions are still open, and will be tackled in future works.
We will investigate the development of methods for discovering inconsistencies
among the specification of one or more artificial institutions. In particular, we are
interested in verifying during the specification phase whether certain norms may
create obligations to perform unauthorized actions, or under what conditions
two norms may generate conflicting commitments. Moreover we intend to devise
an explicit representation of the sanctions and repair procedures connected to
the violation of commitments.
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